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Abatract
A direcled gnnph (N, D) can be interpreted as a hierarchical organization of
the nodes in N in which the ares in D represent daminance mlations between
these nodcs. A rnnking procedure is a mapping that assigns to every digraph a
ranking or ordering of the nodes such that nodes that are ranked `higher' are
more important in the organization than nodes that are ranked `lower'. In this
paper we axiomatize the ranking procedure that is based on the score measure.
In this ranking procedure a node is `better' the more other nodes it dominates.
A weighted directed groph can be interpreted as a dominance structure
whose dominance relations are assigned weights representing the `importance' of
these relations. We extend the ranking by score measure to the class of weighted
ditected graphs and give an axiomatic chazacterization of it.
1 Introduction
A directed graphor digraph is a pair (N, D) where N is a set of nodes and D C N x N is a
binary relation on N. Such a digraph can represent various hierarchical organizations
in which the ares in D represent `dominance relations' between the nodes in N. A
digraph is called a weak order if it is complete and transitive. Completeness means
that for every pair i,j E N it holds that {(i, j), (j, i)} f1D ~ 0. (Note that completeness
implies rejiexivity, i.e., (i, i) E D for all i E N.) Transitivity means that for every triple
i, j, h E N such that (i, j) E D and (j, h) E D it holds that (i, h) E D. A weak order
(N, D) can alternatively be represented as follows. Let i, j E N. Then we denote i~ j
if and only if (i,j) E D. Given this representation of a weak order we denote i~ j if
and only iC (i,j) E D and (j, i) ~ D. Furthe.r we denote i~ j ií and only if (i,j) E D
and (j, i) E D. If i} j then we could say thaL node i is `at Icast as good' as node
j, while if i~ j we could say that i is `better' than j. If i~ j then i and j are
`indifferent'. In this way a weak order can be seen as a ranking or ordering of a set of
nodes. A ranking prncedure on N is a mapping that assigns to every digraph such a
ranking.
A possible interpretation of a digraph in which it is useful to rank the nodes is
that it represents a competition being played among certain teams or players. In that
case the nodes represent the players that participate in the competition and (i, j) E Dz
means that player i has won the match he played against player j. This interpretation
can be found in, e.g. Rubinstein (1980) and Laffont, Laslier and LeBreton (1993).
Anothcr interpretation can be found in van den Brink and Gilles (1992a). T'here the
nodes represent a set of economic agents that are engaging in some economic trade
proccss such that (i, j) E D means that agent i sets the conditions under which binary
trade bctween agent j and himself will take place. (For example, agent i sets the
prices under which he exchanges commodities with agent j.) Another interpretation
of (i, j) E D is that agent i has veto power over the actions undectaken by agent j.
A game theoretic analysis of this interpretation is given in Gilles, Owen and van den
Brink (1992).
These are interpretations in which the set of nodes correspond to a set of agents
or players. If the set of nodes represent a set of alternatives between which an agent
or group of agents have to choose then the digraph (N, D) can represent a preference
mlatian. 'Chen (i, j) E D means that an agent or group of agents when pairwise
c~ompariug alternativc~s i and j prefers i Lo j (cL Sen (1979)).
ln this paper we discuss a specific ranking procedure, namely the one that is based on
the score measure. In this ranking procedure a node is `better' the more other nodes
it dominates.
In section 2 we present the score measure and the ranking procedure that is
based on it and give an axiomatic characterization of this ranking procedure. This is
a generalization of the result stated in Rubinstein (1980) who axiomatized the ranking
by score measure restricted to the class of tournamentsr.
In section 3 we extend the ranking by score measure to the class of weighted
diriected graphs. In a weighted digraph the relations are assigned weights which can be
secn as mcasures of the `importance' of the relations. A ranking procedure for weighted
digraphs assigns a ranking of the nodes ofevery weighted digraph taking Lhe weights of
the relations into account. We also give an axiomatic characterization of this ranking
procedure for weighted digraphs.
c A digraph (N, D) ie a tournament iC (i, í) ~ D(or all i E N and for all i, j E N with i~ j it holda
that either (i, j) E D or (j, i) E D.Wc, r~uuclude~ t.his se~c:t.ion by presenting sorne concepts abouL digraphs that will be used
in this papc~r. Wi, conci,ntratc~ on finilc irrcJicTávc digraphs. n digraph (N, D) is finitc
if .N is (initi~ ancl it is irrcllexive if (i, i) ~ I) for cvcry i E N. Wc sirnply re[er to Lhese
graphs as digraphs. Note that it is allowed that both (i,j) E U and (j,i) E U. In the
sequel we assume the set N to be fixed and therefore we represent a digraph just by
its binary re.lation D. 'I'he collection of all digraphs on N represented by their binary
rclal,iun is dcnotcd by DN.
Let U E DN. If (i, j) E D then j is called a successor of i and i is called a
pm.decessor of j in D. For i E N we define SD(i) :- {j E N ~(i,j) E D} being the
collection of all successors of i in D and PD(i) :- {j E N ~(j,i) E D} being the
collection of predecessors of i in D. (In the sequel we will often omit the subscript D.)
A wcighted digraph is a pair (N,w) where N is a finite set of nodes and ~: N x N--.
Rt is a wcight function which assigns a non-negative real value to each ordered pair
(i., j) E N x N such Lhat ~(i,i) - 0 for all i E N. The value w(i, j) is a measure of
how strongly node i dominaf,es node j. Sirnilarly as for (non-weighted) digraphs we
represent a we.ighted digraph on N just by its weight function. A digraph D E DN can
be seen as a weighted digraph w which assigns the value I to every relation (i, j) E D
and thc value 0 to all other relations.
2 Ranking the nodes in a digraph
In this section we discuss a specific ranking procedure that assigns a weak order rep-
resenting a ranking of the nodes to every digraph. This ranking procedure is based on
the .score measure2.
Definition 2.1 The score measure is the function Q: DN -~ IIi.N given by
a;(D) :- ~S(i) for all á E N and D E DN.
1Although mvAtly used for lournaments Lhe score measurc can easily be generalized Lo the clase o(
all digraphs as is done in Ikfinition 2.1.4
"I'hus th~~ scorc mea.cure a.csigns t.o each node in a digraph the number of nodes it
do~ninati~s". I~ix an axioniatization of this scorc mcasurc for digraplrs wc refer to van
den 13rink and Gilles (19926). In the ranking by score measure a node is `better' the
higher its score is, i.e., the more nodes it dominates. We denote the collection of all
weak orders on N by WON.
Definition 2.2 'I'hr. ranking by score measure is the mapping ~o: DN ~ WON
mhich Jor every D E DN is given 6y
i}„ (D) j if and only if o;(D) ~ o~(D).
In Rubinstein (1980) this ranking by score measure is axiomatized restricted to the
class of tournaments. Here we generalize this result for arbitrary digraphs. The first
axiom is au anonimity axiom.
Axiom 2.3 (Anonimity) For every D E D`~ and permutation ~r: N-r N it holds
that i}o (D) j if and only éf a(í) ~, (arD) a(j), where aD E DN is given by
(rr(i),a(j)) E aD if arzd only if (i,j) E D.
The second axiom states that given a particular digraph it is always better to have
rnore successors.
Axiom 2.4 (Positive responsiveness) Let D E DN and i, j, h E N, i~ j be such
that (i, h) ~ D. Further, !et D' - D U {(i, h)}.
Ifi~(D) j thenir(D') j.
['inally, the third axiom states that the orde.r between two nodes does not change if
changes only take place in relations on which they are not the dominating nodes.
Axiom 2.5 (Independence of non-dominated relations) Let D, D' E DN and
i,j E N be such that So(i) - SD~(i) and SD(j) - SD~(j). Then
i~- (D) j iJ and only if i ~(D') j.
3For some properties of the ecore meaeure for tournamente we refer to Behzad, Chartrand and
I.esniak-Faeter (1979).5
These three axioms uniquely determine the ranking by score measure. Rubinstein
(1980) also uses anonimity and positive responsiveness in axiomatizing this ranking
procedure restricted to the class of tournaments. The independence of non-dominated
re~lations axiorn is a strengthening of the corresponding axiom used by Rubinstein which
states that the order between two nodes dces not change if changes only take place in
relations on which they are neither the predecessor nor the successor.
Theorem 2.8 The ranking procedune ~:DN -~ WON is equal to ranking by score
measure íf and only if it satisfies anonimity, positive repsponsiveness and independence
of non-dominated relations.
PROOF
[t is easy to check that the ranking by score measure satisfies the three axioms.
Now suppose that the ranking procedure r:DN -a WON satisfies the three axioms
and let D E DN. We. prove that it has to be the ranking by score measure in three
steps.
(a)
We first prove that for each pair i, j E N it holds that i-r(D) j if Q;(D) - o~(D).
Therefore let i, j E N be such that a;(D) - v~(D).
Consider the digraph D where D:- {(i,h) ~ h E S(i)} U{(j,h) ~ h E S(j)}. For this
digraph it holds that Sn(i) - SD(i) and Sn(j) - SD(j). We now prove that i~(D) j.
(It is clear that independence of non-dominated relations then implies that i~(D) j.)
We distinguish the following four cases with respect to the pair á, j.
(~) Suppose that (i, j) ~D and (j,i) ~ D.
Since o;(D) - a~(D) and i ~[Sp(j) U PD(j)] it follows from anonimity of ~-
that i ~(D) j.
The digraph D in this case is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure A-
Sn(z) `Sn(7), B- Sn(J) `So(t), c- Sn(z) n Sn(7), and E - N`[Sn(i) U
Sn(j) U {i,j}]. It is clear t,hat ~A -~B since a;(D) - o~(D).s
V
C
Figure 1: Digraph D in case (i, j) ~ D and (j,i) ~ D
(ii) Suppose Lhat (i, j) E D and (j,i) E D.
Sincc a;(U) - a~(D) and i E [So(j) fl 1'p(j)] it follows Irom anonimity oí ~
that, i ~(D) j.
'I'hc digraph U in Lhis ca,vc is illustratcd in I~igure 2. In this figurc A-
SD(2) `[5~D(j) U{j}], B- SD(j) `[Sn(z) U {á}], L - SD(i) n SD(j), and
E- N`(SD(i) U SD(j) U{i, j}]. Again ~A -~B.
(iii) Suppose that (i, j) E D and (j,í) ~ D.
Since o;(D) - v~(D) it must hold that SD(j)`S~(i) ~ 0. Let h E S~(j)`SD(i).
I.CL A- Sp(Y) `(SD(.7) U{7}), B- SD(.7) `(SD(a) U{Ía}), c- SD(L) n SD(7),
and F, - N`(SD(i) U SD(j) U{i, j}). (Note that ~A -~B.) The digraph D
in this case is illustrated in Figure 3.








Figure 3: Digraph D in case (i, j) E D, (j,i) ~ Dti
b a
Figure 4: Digraph D'
D' - D U {(h,ak) ~ 1 C k G t} U{(h,i)} U{(h,g) ~ g E C}
U~~J`~-, ( {(ak, 6i) ~ k G l G t} U{(ak,a~) ~ 1 C 1 C k- 1} U{(ak,7)} U{(ak,g) I 9 E C})~
U~~Jk-, ({(6k,a~ ~ k.} 1 C l c t} U{(bk,b~) ~ 1 C l G k- 1} U {(bk,i), ( bk, h)} U{(bk,g) ~ g E C})~
Digraph D' is illustrated in Figure 4 in case ~A -~B - 1(in this figure we
have deleted the nodes in C and E).
From anonimity of ~ it follows that i~(D') j.
Since So~(í) - S~(i) and SD~(j) - S~(j) it follows from independence oí
non-dominated relations that i~(D) j.
(iv) Suppose that (i, j) ~ D and (j,i) E D.
1'hen i ti(D) j follows similarly as under (iii) with the roles of i and j reversed.
Since i ~(D) j as shown above, SD(i) - SD(i) and So(j) - SD(j) it follows with
índependence of non-dominated relations that i~(D) j.
1'hus we have proved that undet anonimity and independence of non-dominated rela-
tions it holds that i~(D) j if o;(D) - o~(D).
(b)s
Now supposc without loss of generality that o;(D) ~ a~(D).
Let the digraph D be such that the following conditions are satisfied:
. D C D;
. For every h E N`{i} and every g E N it holds that (h,g) E D if and only if
(h,9) E D;
. a,(!)) - oi(D).
(Since o;(U) 1 o~(U) such a D always exists.)
As shown above it follows from anonimity and independece of non-dominated relations
that i ~(D) j.
Repcated application oí the positive responsiveness axiom then yields that i r(D) j.
'I'hus x Y(D) j if a;(U) ~ o~(D).
(c )
l)ndcr (a) wc have shown that j ~(D) i if a;(D) G o~(D). This implies that a;(D) ~
o~(D) if i r(D) j.
Thus we have proved that if a ranking procedure satisfies the three axioms then it has
to be the ranking by score measure.
0
We conclude this section by giving an example which illustrates that all three axioms
that are stated in Theorcm 2.6 are necessary in order to uniquely determine the ranking
by score measure.
Example 2.7 Consider the digraph D on N- { 1, 2, 3, 4} which is given by D-
{(i,a),(I,~), (a,a), (2,~), (3,4)}.lo
I 2
4 3
'I'he score rneasure of this digraph is given by (2, 2,1, 0).
'Phus thc ranking by score measure yields the order: 1~0 2 Yo 3~-0 4.
Next we give four alternative ranking procedures that each satisfy two but not all three
oí the axioms stated in Theorem 2.6.
1. het the nodes in N be labelled by the numbers 1 to n a,nd let the ranking proce-
durc ~~ for every D E DN be given by
z~~ (D) j if and only if cithcr [~S(z) )~S(~)]
or (~S(i) -~S(j) and i G j]
This ranking procedure satisfies all three axioms except anonimity. I'or the
digraph U given above it holds that 1 Y1 (D) 2 although S(1) - S(2) and
~'(1) - P(2).
2. Let thc ranking procedure ~2 be such that all nodes are `equal' irrespective of
the dominance relation, i.e., for every D E DN it holds that i~2 (D) j for all
i,jEN.
This ranking procedure satisfies all three axioms except positive responsiveness.
Consider the digraph D given above and the digraph D' - D U{(1,2)}.
If the positive responsiveness axiom is satisfied then it must hold that 1 ~Z (D') 2
since 1~z (D) 2. But 1~2 (D') 2. ~It
a. I,eL thc ranking procedurc ~;r for every U E DN be given by
i ~;r(D) J if and only if ~S(a) - ~P(:) ~ ~S(7) - ~P(7)-
This ranking procedure satisfies all three axioms except independence of non-
dominated relations. Consider the digraph D given above and the digraph D' -
1) U {(3,`L)}.
If the independence of non-dorninated realtions axiom is satisfied then it must
lrold that 1~3 (D') 2 since 1~3 (D) 2 and D' is as described in axiom 2.5. But
1 ~,(D') 2.
3 Weighted directed graphs
A dominance structure on a set of nodes N in which not all dominance relations are
equally important can be represented by a weighted directed graph (N,w) where the
weight function w: N x N~ Rt is such that w(i, i)- 0 for all i E N. The value
w(i, j) is a measure of how strongly node i dominates node j. If w(i, j) - 0 then node
i dces not dominate node j at all. In this section we generalize the score measure to
the class of weighted digraphs and give axiomatizations of the ranking procedure that
is based on iL. We denote the collection of all weighted digraphs on N represented by
their weight function by WN.
Definition 3.1 The weighted score measure is the function a:WN -~ RN which
i.v given b~
v;(w) :- ~ w(í, j) for all i E N and w E WN.
)EN
Thus the weighted score measure assigns to every node i E N in a weighted digraph
w thc sum of the weights of all relations on which i is the dominating node. As said
in Lhe introduction, a(non weighted) digraph D can be scr.n as a weighted digraph w
with12
r 1 for all (i, j) E D
w(Z,7) - Sl
0 else.
'L'hcn it is easy to see that o;(w) is equal to the score of i in the (non-weighted) digraph
D. Thus the weighted score measure indeed is a generalization of the score measure.
Next we straightforwardly generalize the ranking procedure for weighted digraphs that
is bascd on this wcightcd scorc mcasurc.
Definition 3.2 The ranking by weighted score measure is the mapping ro:WN -~
WC)N which for every w E WN is given by
i ro (w) ,7 if and only if o-;(w) ~ o~(w).
The ranking by weighted score measure can be axiomatized by generalizing the three
axioms that axiomatized the ranking by score measure in Theorem 2.6 plus adding a
new axiom.
Axiom 3.3 (Weighted anonimity) !br evenJ w E WN and pcrmutation ~r: N~ N
it holds lhat i ~o (w) j if and only if ~r(i) ro (aw) ~r(j), where aw E WN is given by
rrw(n(i), ~r(j)) - w(i, j) for all (i, j) E N x N.
Axiom 3.4 (Weighted positive responsiveness) Get w E WN and let w' E
be such that for some pair i, h E N there is a positive constant c) 0 such that:
~(R 9) -
w(R 9) else.
If i r(w) 7 then i~(w') 7.
WN
Axiom 3.5 (Independence of weighted non-dominated relations) Let w,w' E
WN and i, j E N, i~ j be such that w'(i, h) - w(i, h) and w'(j, h) - w(j, h) for all
h E N. 7'hen
w(P, 9) -} c iÍ (P, 9) -(i, h)
i r(w) j if and only ij i~(~i) 7.13
Let w,w' E WN. Then we define (w f w') E WN by (w f w')(i, j) :- w(i, j) f c.i(i, j)
for all (i, j) E N x N. Next we introduce a new axiom which states that if we add two
weighted digraphs in the way described above and node i is at least as good as node j
in both weighted digraphs then node i is at least as good as node j in the sum digraph.
Axiom 3.6 (Order preservation) Let w, 4i E WN and !et i, j E N. If i r(w) j and
i~(w') j then i r(w -~ ~.i) j.
These four axioms uniquely determine the ranking by weighted score measure for
weighted digraphs.
Theorem 3.7 The ranking prucedure r:WN -~ WON is equal to the ranking by
weighted score measur~e ij and only if it satisfies weighted anonimity, weághted positive
responsiveness, independence of weighted non-dominated relations and orderpreserva-
tion.
PROOF
It is easy to check that the ranking by weighted score measure satisfies the four axioms.
Now suppose that the ranking procedure ~: WN -~ WON satisfies the four axioms
and let w E WN.
(a)
We first prove that for each pair i, j E N it holds that i~(w) j if v;(w) - v~(w).
Therefore let i, j E N be such that o;(w) - o~(w).
Consider the weighted digraph w E WN given by
~ w(h,g) if h E {i, j}, g E N
w(h'9) - 0 else.
Further for every w E WN we introduce the following.
m(w):- min{w(h,g)~(h,g) E N x N and w(h,g) 1 0}
M(w) :- {(h,g) E N x N ~ w(h,g) - m(w)}14
W~~ niay snpposc withont loss of gcnerality Lhat w(t,7) ~ w(J,t).
Next we cunstrucL a collection of weighLe.~l digraphs {wk}o~k~~ (or sorne finite l E N
such that nodes à and j are `symmetric' in each of these digraphs, and thus we can apply
weighted anonimity to conclude that à~(wk) j in all those digraphs. We construct
this collection of weighted digraphs using the following procedure.
STEP 1 Let wo be given by
~(h,9) - ! w(7,z) if (h,9) E {(z,7),(J,t)}
l 0 else.
(Anonimity of r clearly implies that i~(wo) j.)
Now let wl E WN be given by
w(h,9~-w(7,i) ~f (h,9)E {(L,3),(7,a)}
~'(h,9) ~- w(h,9) else.
(Note that io~(j,i) - 0 and w~(i, j) 1 0.)
Letk-O.
STEP 2 IF {(h,g) E N x N ~ w t'(h,g) ~ 0} - 0 then let t- k and sTOP.
ELSE since v;(w) - o~(w) and a;(wm) - ai(wm) for all 0 C m C k, we know that
there must exist at least one h E N`{i} such that wtl(i,h) ) 0 and at least
one g E N ` {i, j} such that ~tl(j,g) ~ 0.
Let k- k f 1 and GOTO STEP 3.
STEP 3 Take a (p,q) E M(i~k). (Note that p E{i,j}.) Since v;(w) - o~(w) and
a;(wm) - o~(wm) for all 0 C m C k there exista an (r,s) E N x N such that
r-{i, j} `{p} and w(r,s) ~ 0.
Let wk}`: N x N-~ R be given by
wk(h,9)-m(wk) if (h,9) E {(p,q),(r,s)}
~}~(h,.q) - - ~k(h,9) clse.15
N `{i, j,q,s}
wk(z,q) - wk(7, s)
N `{i,j,q}
wk(x, 9) - wk(J, 9)
Figure 5: Weighted digraph wk in case (i,j) ~{(p,q),(r,s)}
(Clearly cakt~(p,q) - 0 and ~.~ i tr(h,g) 1 0 for all (h,g) ~(p,q), thus wk}I E
Y~N.)
Next we distinguish between the following two cases:
IF (i,j) ~{(p,q),(r,s)} then let wk be given by
- J m(wk} if (h,9) E {(P,9),(r,s)}
w (h,9) :-
0 else. k ll
The weighted digraph w~ is illustrated in Figure 5(with p- i and r - j)
in case q~ s respectively if q- s. (Note that anonimity implies that
ti ~(wk) J-)
GOTO STEP 2.
ELSE (i, j) E{(p,q),(r,s)}. Suppose that (i, j) -(p,q) (and thus r- j). Then
let wk be given by
wk(h,9) :- S m(~~) if (h,9) E {(i,7),(7,s),(s,t)}
l 0 else.
The weighted digraph wk is illustrated in Figure 6.
(Anonimity also implies that i~(wk) j in this case..)
If (i, j) - (r, s) then we do the same but with s replaced by q. GOTO STEP
2.16
N ` {i, j, s}
wk(2,~) - wk(~v 9) ' wk(s, Z)
Figure 6: Weighted digraph wk in case (i,j) E {(p,q),(r,s)}
Since o;(w) - a~(w) this procedure leads to a collection of weighted digraphs {wk}o~k~c
which have been constructed such that nodes i and j are `symmetric' in each of these
weighted digraphs.
Weighted anonimity then implies that for every wk, 0 G k G t, it holds that i~(wk) j
Now let ~.i E WN be given by w'(i,~) :- ~,`E-owk(i,j) for all (i,j) E N x N.
Order preservation then implies that i~(w') j.
If w(i, j) - w(j,i) then wo(i, j) - wo(j,i) - w(i, j) and wk(i, j) - r.~` i (j,i) - 0 for all
1 G k G t and thus case 2 in step 3 cannot occur. But then w' - w and thus i~(w) j.
rlse w(i, j) 1 w(j,i), and then there is some s E N`{i} and some positive constant
c 1 0 such that
W(h,9) - w(h,9) f c if (h,9) -(s,i)
w(h,g) else.
(This s is the one in Figure 6.)
Independence of non-dominated weighted relations then yields that in this case also
z ~(w) J.
Thus i~(w) j, and since w(i,g) - w(i,g) and w(j,g) - ïv(j,g) for all g E N indepen-
dence of non-dominated weighted relations implies that i~(w) j.17
Thus we have shown that i~(w) j if o;(w) - o~(w).
(b)
Next suppose without loss of generality that o;(w) ~ v~(w).
Let the weighted digraph w E WN be such that the following conditions are satisfied:
~ w(h,g) G w(h,g) for all (h,g) E N x N;
~ w(h,g) - w(h,g) for all h E N`{i} and g E N;
~ a;(w) - Qi(w).
Sincc Q;(w) ~ o~(w) such a w always exists.
As shown above it follows from weighted anonimity, independence of non-dominated
weighted relations, and the order preserving property that i~(w) j.
Repeated application of the weighted positive responsiveness axiom then yields that
a ~- (w) ,7.
Thus i}(w) j if v;(w) ~ Q~(w).
(c)
We have shown above that j Y(w) i if o;(w) G Q~(w). This implies that Q;(w) ? o~(w)
if i ~ (w) j.
Thus we have proved that if a ranking procedure satisfies the four axioms stated in
'Pheorem 3.7 then it has to be the ranking by weighted score measure.
L]
We conclude this paper by giving an example which illustrates that all four axioms that
are stated in Theorem 3.7 are necessary in order to uniquely determine the ranking by
weighted score measure for the class of weighted digraphs.
Example 3.8 Consider the weighted digraph w on N-{ 1, ..., 4} which is given by:
1 if (i,j) E {(1,3),(1,4),(2,3),(2,4)}
w(i,j)- 2 if (i, j)-(3, 4)
0 else.tn
'I'hcn a(w) -(l,'l,'L,0) and I,hc rankiug by gcncralizcd scorc nicasurc yiclds: 1 ti„
(w) 2~o (w) 3)-o (w) 4. Next we give íour alternative ranking procedures for weighted
digraphs that cach satisfy three but not all four of the axioms stated in Theorem 3.7.
'Phe fint, thrce alternative ranking procedures are generalizations of the three ranking
procedures that are given in Example 2.7.
]. Let thc nodes in N bc labclled by the numbers 1 to n and Ict the ranking proce-
dure r4 for every w E WN be given by
i~4(w) j if and only if either [a;(w) ~ o~(w)J
or [v;(w) - Qi(w) and i G 7J
NoLe that i}~ (w) j if and only if i Y~ (w) j. This ranking procedure satisfies all
four axioms except weighted anonimity. For the weighted digraph w given above
it holds that 1~4 (w) 2 although w(1, h) - w(2, h) and w(h, 1) - w(h, 2) for all
la E N.
2. Let the ranking procedure ~-s for every w E WN be given by: i~s (w) j for all
i, j E N.
This ranking procedure satisfies all four axioms except weighted positive respon-
siveness. Consider the weighted digraph w given above and the weighted digraph
w' -(N,r.i) where w'(i,j) -
2 if (i,j) - (1,3)
w(i, j) else.
If the weighted positive responsiveness axiom is satisfied then it must hold that
I rs (w') 2 since 1~s (w) 2. But 1~s (w') 2.
3. Lct Lhe ranking procedure rs for evcry w E WN be given by
i }s (~) J if and only if ~ w(i, h) -~ w(h, i) ~
hEN hEN
~ w(j, h) - ~ w(h,j)
hEN hEN19
~'his ranking procedure satisfies all four axioms except independence of non-
dominated weighted relations. Consider the weighted digraph w given above and
the weighted digraph w' where ~.i(i,j) -
1 if (i, j) -{(3,2)}
w(i, j) else.
If independence of non-dominated weighted relations is satisfied then it must
hold that 1~6 (w') 2 since 1~s (w) 2 and w' is as described in axiom 3.5. But
I Ys (w') 2.
4. Let á: WN -~ RN be given by:
ïr;(w):-~{jEN~w(i,j)~0}foralliENandwEWN.
'I'hus v assigns to every weighted digraph w the score measure of the (non-
weighted) digraph D where D- {(i,j) E N x N ~ w(i, j) ~ 0}. Now let
the ranking procedure ~r for every w E WN be given by
i r~(w) j if and only if ó;(w) . a;(w) 1 á~(w) . o~(w).
This ranking procedure satisfies all four axioms except the order preserving prop-





1 for all (i,j) E {(1,3),(2,3),(2,4),(3,4)}
0 else,
1 for all (i,j) E {(1,4),(3,4)}
0 else.
Then 3~r (wr) 1 and 3 ~7 (w~) 1. Since (wl ~ w~) - w, if the order preserving
property is satisfied it must hold that 3}-7 (w) 1. But 1 r~ (w) 3.
Thus all four axioms that are stated in Theorem 3.7 are necessary in order to uniquely
determine the ranking by generalized score measure for weighted digraphs.20
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